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The Challenge of
Understanding Radical Constructivism
Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr. A Boise State University (USA) <ddykstra@boisestate.edu>
To say “it is” is to grasp for permanence.
To say “it is not” is to adopt the view of nihilism.
Therefore a wise person
Does not say “exists” or “does not exist.”
– Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakarika,
2nd century C.E. (Garfield 1995, Chapter 15:10)
honestly agree or disagree with someT oone’s
position, one must first understand that person’s position. Only then can
one really decide about the other person’s
position.
Many people have expressed disagreement
with von Glasersfeld’s notion of radical constructivism.1 The list of references to the
expressions of disagreement in print is very
large. In addition there are probably gigabytes
of such expressions on-line. Much of the
debate has been on a philosophical level,
removed at least somewhat from application.2 But some have gone so far as to claim
that radical constructivism is dangerous
when applied to education.3
Most, if not all, of these lines of disagreement with radical constructivism have one
aspect in common. They are expositions of
how radical constructivism contains contradictions with the basic premises of realism.
Unfortunately, this common thread is not
acknowledged.

A fundamental
difference
The basic position of radical constructivism is
fundamentally incommensurate with that of
realism. Von Glasersfeld (1999a, [13]) puts
forth the essential difference:
“What differentiates radical constructivism
from the tradition, is the proposal unequivocally to give up the notion that knowledge
ought to be a veridical ‘representation’ of a
world as it ‘exists’ prior to being experienced (that is, ontological reality).”
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Purpose:This contribution to the Festschrift honoring Ernst von Glasersfeld gives some
insight into the perpetual problem of understanding radical constructivism (RC). Parallels
with the Middle Way school of Buddhism appear to shed light on this challenge.
Conclusions:The hegemony realism has over the thinking of even the most highly educated in our civilization plays a major role in their failure to understand RC. Those still
subject to realism in their thinking interpret statements by those in RC in ways incompatible with RC. Until realists disequilibrate over mismatches between realist expectations and experiences, no alternative way of thinking is accessible to them and
misinterpretations of RC will continue. Practical implications:While we cannot change
someone else’s understanding, in our interactions with them we can focus on creating
situations in which those who do not understand us might disequilibrate. If we are successful, they are likely to begin to escape the domination of realism in their thinking.
Value:This insight may enable eventual success in our assisting others to understand RC.
Key words: Realism, Buddhism, disequilibration.
Coming from a different experience, history and philosophy of physics, Max Jammer
(1957, p. 2) seems to be referring to the same
thing when in the middle of the last century
he wrote:
“As a result of modern research in physics,
the ambition and hope, still cherished by
most authorities of the last century, that
physical science could offer a photographic picture and true image of reality
had to be abandoned.”
Still, the realist position is alive and well in
physics, as evidenced by this comment from
de la Torre and Zamorano (2001, p. 103):
“…we postulate the objective existence of
physical reality that can be known to our
minds… with an ever growing precision by
the subtle play of theory and experiment.”
It appears that a consequence of the realist
position is: everything is ultimately about the
truth, which can be known. Furthermore, in
realism, when comparing two statements
about the world it must be possible to determine which is closer to the truth. On the other
hand, in radical constructivism, truth is not
the point because such truth is not accessible.
In radical constructivism our ways of knowing do not access such truth. Hence, the two
positions could hardly be more different.

The problem with the
debates about radical
constructivism
The issue of initial assumptions

Every position, paradigm or ideology that
describes the nature of human knowing is
based on its own particular set of initial
assumptions. Initial assumptions are at best
taken on belief and fit with experience.4 It
appears the initial assumptions of a culture
are uncritically adopted as an implicit part of
one’s milieu by those less careful or thoughtful. Initial assumptions cannot be known to
be true. They cannot be proved.
If one discovers an initial assumption does
not fit experience, then the logical structure
built on this assumption is at least suspect, if
not demolished. No challenges to radical constructivism seem to explore this avenue.
Initial assumptions are usually very hard,
if not impossible, to test. Even if one were to
come to understand another view and its initial assumptions, understanding the initial
assumptions generally reveals how well they
too fit experience.5 In the end we come back
to the realization that to choose a set of initial
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assumptions from which to operate is either
an act of faith or an arbitrary decision.
The standards of logic

Each paradigm generally operates by the rules
of logical operations agreed upon by all across
paradigms.6 The structures and conclusions
of each paradigm are merely the proper
results of these logical operations starting
from a particular set of initial assumptions.
For this reason the structures and conclusions
of one paradigm cannot be expected to be
consistent with another paradigm based on
different initial assumptions.
These things being the case, the structures
and conclusions from a paradigm can only be
judged faulty or incorrect, if it can be demonstrated that there is an error in logic at some
point after the initial assumptions, that faulty
data have been used or that the conclusions
do not fit experience. A claim that a conclusion from one paradigm is false because it
does not fit another paradigm is trivial and
non-sequitur. Conclusions from within a particular paradigm are not intended to apply to
another paradigm and cannot logically be
required to apply to that other paradigm’s different set of initial assumptions. It is important to note that since such conclusions are
intended to fit experience, another paradigm
with different initial assumptions may indeed
have an entirely different conclusion to fit the
same experience. Both sets of conclusions are
equally valid, each in their own paradigm.
Sadly, few, if any, of the arguments offered
in the many publications and gigabytes of online discussion attempt to point out an error
in logic from the basic premise of radical constructivism or from faulty data. They all make
the strategic blunder of pointing out errors in
radical constructivism as if it must be commensurate with realism. Hence, much effort
has been expended in this program to prove
radical constructivism wrong, but to no avail.
There are two problems with this strategy.
One, as has been pointed out, is the logical
error that conclusions must be universally
applicable instead of dependent on the initial
assumptions from which they are derived.
The other is that such lines of reasoning reveal
that their architects are not operating from
the initial assumptions of radical constructivism. Such arguments are not likely to impress
the thoughtful observer of such debates, let
alone change someone’s mind.
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To challenge a view
Observing then that thoughtful people work
diligently and carefully to reason appropriately from initial assumptions and that the
initial assumptions too are subjected to
intense scrutiny to check how well they fit
experience, how can one judge a paradigm?
Beyond previous experience, the only way is
to test its usefulness. Do the predictions
made from it fit experience? Can it be used to
successfully accomplish desirable goals? As
von Glasersfeld (1999a, [3]) has put it:
“Ultimately, of course, a way of thinking
must not only be claimed feasible but, in
order to become attractive, its advantages
must be shown in action.”
We shall come back to some evidence of
the usefulness of radical constructivism later
in this piece.

Evidence of the logical
error: An example
Consider an example illustrating the logical
errors made by realists attempting to prove
radical constructivism wrong, useless or
dangerous. The point in bringing up this
example and commentary is not to demonstrate the superiority of one view over
another, but the logical errors typically made
in such arguments.
One can see the persistence of realist
assumptions in the following comment by
Owen (1999, [4]) in response to von Glasersfeld’s paper (1999a).7(Sentences have been
numbered in arabic numerals surrounded
by curled brackets to facilitate reference in
the following analysis.)
“{1}The Archimedian predicament above
is joined by the much-discussed paradoxicality when radical constructivism tries
to observe itself and construct a theoretical similitude of itself that can be {i}
selected as the most ‘efficient’ among others by means of a criterion of judgment
that is likewise selected in a non-arbitrary
manner, while {ii} avoiding the appearance of violating its own Canon of the
subjectivity of efficiency or utility. {2}
How can a Doctrine of the Subjectivity of
‘Knowledge’ describe itself in generally
valid terms? {3 } After all, we cannot claim
that the Doctrine of radical constructriv-

ism is a prior principle or schematum for
the synthetic understanding of itself. {4}
I falter here, as Kant did: I am seeking to
make objectively valid statements about a
document that specifies such statements
are logically undecidible. {5} One is discouraged from doing the heavy lifting
required here when no matter how intellectually conscientious one is, the reduction to ‘a mere matter of personal opinion’ cannot be logically defeated. {6} Or
the retort, ‘Well, if radical constructivism
works for you, that’s fine!’ {7} No matter
what radical constructivism officially
states, its originators were seeking epistemological ‘Truth’.”8
In the rather long sentence {1} two
attributes of radical constructivism deemed
incompatible are presented. Attribute {i}
refers to a desire for radical constructivism
to be “most “efficient” among others by
means of a criterion of judgment that is …
selected in a non-arbitrary manner.” Of
course, it would be “violating its own Canon
of the subjectivity of…utility,” (attribute
{ii}) if it were to attempt to demonstrate it is
the most superior by non-arbitrary criteria
of judgment. Stated this way there does
appear to be a paradox. But, in radical constructivism, one would neither claim to have
the most efficient explanation or theory nor
that there could be non-arbitrary criteria of
judgment. One might claim that an explanation fits or enables one to be effective at
something, but having the most efficient
explanation is not required. We can never
prove there is not another “more efficient”
explanation out there. Nonetheless, to be
effective or even apparently more effective,
does no more than to suggest a degree of fit
with experience.
Sentences {2} & {3} explicitly reveal the
belief that the goal of radical constructivism
is validity. That Owen wrote to this effect is
evidence that his thinking about radical constructivism is subject to realist criteria. Certainly, if by validity one means truth, or
closer proximity to truth, then this is neither
the goal nor the claim of radical constructivism.
The intent expressed in sentence {4} is to
make “objectively valid statements.” This is a
realist goal, not a radical constructivist goal.
In sentences {5} & {6} the dilemma presented
is the conflict between the desire to logically
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defeat something that does not yield to such
methods. Apparently, intellectual “heavy
lifting” is only rewarded by achieving the
goal of logically disproving something or at
least the possibility of logically disproving
something. Finally, in sentence {7} is the
claim that radical constructivist adherents
are really “seeking epistemological ‘Truth’,”
in spite of what is stated explicitly in the article Owen is commenting upon. It seems
clear, at least from these words, that the realist view is most consistent with the desired
methods and goals: that thinking and logic
can enable us to prove which of two positions
is closer to a veridical picture of reality.
Again, apparently, the point is to come to a
true picture of reality, which can be arrived
at through our mental efforts.9
We see similar evidence that truth is the
be all and end all in determining value in scientific explanation among critics of radical
constructivism in the writing of Matthews
(1998, p. 5):
“There is a not-too-subtle difference
between the constructivist formulation
‘making sense,’ and the realist formulation ‘finding out.’ The former has no epistemological or referential bite; the latter
has both. Things can make perfect sense
without being true; and making still more
sense does not imply any increase in truth
content.”
… and from Kragh (1998, p. 129):
“The epistemology characteristic of constructivists is either relativistic or agnostic,
in the sense that they do not admit any distinction between true and false accounts of
nature…, Denying the existence of an
objective nature, or declaring it without
interest, scientists’ accounts are all there is,
and it is with these accounts the constructivist sociologist is solely concerned. How,
then, do scientists manage to produce
their results and build up a corpus of consensual knowledge about what they call
nature?”
In these two passages there seems to be
the implicit expectation that the sense made
by mere students is extremely unlikely to
resemble what scientists decided before.
This suggests a belief about human nature,
e.g., that most people are not capable of
making the same sense of phenomena that
scientists have in the past. Apparently, in
this view, scientists are the few special peo-
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ple who can make proper sense of the phenomena.
Both authors do seem to be able to give
accurate descriptions of these facets of radical constructivism, but just as they are clear
in their descriptions, they clearly fail to recognize the logical error of expecting radical
constructivism to be consistent with the initial assumptions it has discarded: those of
realism.10 This does not make radical constructivism right, but it renders the arguments of these authors invalid. From the
radical constructivist position, attempting
to make such arguments is inappropriate.
Where did these non-radical constructivist notions come from? The most likely origin could be the realism so prevalent in western culture. This realism is pervasive in our
culture and there is little or no exposure to
an alternative experienced by most of society. It goes unexamined by most members of
the culture. The realist origins of the oftdescribed difficulties are even more plausible when one takes a critical look at many
such passages on difficulties with radical
constructivism. Owen clearly expresses disbelief in the words of the article on which he
is commenting. In paragraph 52 of von Glasersfeld’s article (1999a) we find the following:
“The value of the constructivist model –
and I emphasize once more that radical
constructivism makes no ontological
claims and is intended as no more, but
also no less, than a useful model of
knowledge and the activity of knowing –
will have to be determined by its application to basic problems we run into in the
construction of our experiential worlds.”
It appears then that one major challenge,
possibly the major challenge, in understanding radical constructivism is the pervasive,
implicit grounding we all have in realism
from our culture and our own nature. Until
one gets past this hurdle, one cannot be
described as understanding radical constructivism. Throughout the discussions, arguments and debates concerning radical constructivism, reference to Truth maintains its
presence as revealed by the words of very
intelligent, sincere detractors. This is evidence of the difficulty of letting go of realist
criteria, which are not part of radical constructivism. Such criteria are unnecessary and
counter productive in radical constructivism.

A possible parallel with
Buddhist thought
There are probably readers of these words
more conversant with Buddhism11 than the
author, but it appears that there is a school of
thought in Buddhism that arrived at ideas
similar to those in radical constructivism,
albeit by a different path.12 It has been
explained that these schools of thought are to
be considered a sequence one moves through
or can move through in thinking about the
nature of what we know and how we know
it.13 The final school of thought is called the
Middle Way. An expression of the Middle Way
is the opening passage by Nagarjuna. The
Middle Way appears to have encountered and
continues to encounter challenges very similar to those faced by radical constructivism.
What light might this shed on the challenges
mounted against radical constructivism?
The central idea in the Middle Way when
first translated into English was referred to as
“emptiness.” This word is still used in the literature. What it refers to is the notion that
when we attempt to go beyond the conventional existence of anything, we find no ultimate essence. The consequence is that the
conventional existence of something has a
beginning, middle and end. For Buddhists
this is characteristic of the world we know.
This beginning, middle, and end, sometimes
put as arising, existing, ceasing, applies also
to what we think things are – all things:
objects, ideas, etc. Thus conventional existence is an expression of emptiness. Von Glasersfeld (1999b, [6]) appears to have
intended something similar when he wrote:
“Considered as a proposed way of thinking and not as a description of the way
things are, the question to ask about the
constructivist model is simply: does it give
a viable account of the knowledge I rely on
in my actual living. I obviously believe it
does – but this in no way denies the possibility that tomorrow or the next day a
more elegant or effective model might be
constructed.”
Without ultimate essence there is no veridical picture of essential or ultimate reality.
Any current viable account of experience that
exists now, arose and we can expect it to be
discarded at some point in the future for
another viable account that we consider
more useful at that point.
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A text on the Middle Way was written by
the Buddhist scholar, Nagarjuna, in the second century C. E. This text is still studied by
Buddhist scholars today. In it Nagarjuna
explains and defends the Middle Way in verse
form. The book from which the opening
translation was taken includes a very interesting and useful commentary. What is considered to describe the Middle Way in a nutshell
is Chapter 24, verse 18 (Garfield 1995):
“Whatever is dependently co-arisen
That is explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation,
Is itself the middle way.”
It appears that what is meant here is that
the impermanence of everything we know
conventionally means that everything we
know conventionally lacks ultimate essence;
it is empty. Any essence we might perceive is
our own imputation, human construction.
In addition the designation “empty” is itself
empty; hence, emptiness is empty of ultimate
essence, also. This notion that emptiness
itself is empty seems to be very similar to a
claim repeated by radical constructivists
(Glasersfeld 1999a, [4]):
“I would be contradicting one of the basic
principles of my own theory if I were to
claim that the constructivist approach
provides a true description of an objective
state of affairs.”
Challenges to the Middle Way come from
essentialism in its various forms. Essentialism
entails the notion that the ultimate essence of
something exists and can be known. A consequence of this ultimate essence of something
is permanence, hence it does not arise nor
does it cease and it can have no cause either to
arise or to cease. There are two extremes in
essentialism. In the case of the reification of
the phenomenal world then emptiness
(dependence) cannot exist, but ultimate
essence does. In the case of the reification of
emptiness, nihilism, the phenomenal world
cannot exist, hence the ultimate essence of the
phenomenal world is permanent non-existence. These two extremes in essentialism
seem to be realism and solipsism, respectively.
Either physical reality exists or it does not. If
it exists, then we can work on knowing it better and better. The only other option in essentialism is non-existence.
The nature of the responses Nagarjuna
makes to challenges to the Middle Way
become evident when one reads the commen-
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tary. Repeatedly he shows how positions
involving either extreme of essentialism, lead
to contradiction. The only way to avoid these
contradictions is to avoid the extremes of
essentialism. Avoiding the contradictions
enables one to be consistent with the fundamental Buddhist tenets.14 This middle path
then holds emptiness, as well as all of the phenomenal world, as empty.
Every challenge to the Middle Way is effectively countered by Nagarjuna in essentially
this same way. The many examples of Nagarjuna’s counters to the challenges suggest that
the chief challenge to understanding the Middle Way has its origins in not being able to step
outside of essentialism, i.e., realism. Hence,
even in cultures considered to be majority
Buddhist, the notion of the Middle Way was
misunderstood, apparently in a way very similar to the misunderstanding of radical constructivism.
This may help us to understand better our
own situation in which so many seem to misunderstand radical constructivism. Even in a
setting in which a similar philosophical position is officially sanctioned, there is resistance
of the same sort. Apparently the situation is
not simply a matter of our realist culture but
of something deeper in the human experience
and functioning.15

What can we do?
Considering possible responses to the challenge of understanding radical constructivism, we need to keep in mind important features of radical constructivism:
1. Meaning exists only in the mind, hence it
cannot be transmitted (Glasersfeld, in
press)
2. The only person who can make new
understanding for a person is that person.
3. In the case of communication, meaning
can be negotiated, but at best we can only
take this negotiated meaning as shared.
4. Meaning or understanding is formulated
to fit experience, and so revised when
needed.
The consequence of these features of radical constructivism is that we should strive to
emulate von Glasersfeld (1999b, [1]) – as he
explained:
“I entered the fray neither to preach nor to
convince, but in the hope of being criti-

cized in a way that might push me to think
and above all to express my thoughts more
clearly.”
Certainly, given the number of recurrences
of application of realist criteria to radical constructivism and the number of responses to
these misapplications in different words and
different contexts, it appears that there is no
magic bullet, no set of words that can be used
to avoid initial misunderstanding of what is
intended by radical constructivism.16 The
results of von Glasersfeld’s eloquence over
many years now support this contention. The
process of constructing a new understanding
is a process, not something that can be handed
out to anyone who will read or listen. Similarly, the practitioners of the Buddhist
Madhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophy
point out that a crucial feature is meditative
praxis that enables the experience of the emptiness of all phenomena. This significance of
process in knowing, both on the part of radical constructivism and of the Buddhist Middle Way, is in stark contrast with the realism
that dominates Western philosophy and science with the focus on final product.

Disequilibration as
central to change in
understanding
The problem of realists understanding radical constructivism is analogous to that in science education (Dykstra 2005). Those teaching science usually have significantly
different understandings of the phenomena
than their students. This has been known for
some time and is well documented (Duit
2006). Much effort has been expended by
many very diligent, sincere, intelligent
instructors, yet the outcome is most students
leave with the same understanding of the
phenomena they came with, new terms notwithstanding. Meaning was not transmitted
to the students (Duit 2006). Of course, this
negative result has to be explained. The realist
adopts the elitist doctrine that only a few special students can properly receive what has
been transmitted. radical constructivism
offers an alternative.
If meaning cannot be transmitted, then is
instruction for all a hopeless cause? It appears
that attempts to transmit meaning in science
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instruction generally fail. To attempt to transmit something entails something that can be
transmitted. In realism this meaning, often
called knowledge, is assumed to have this
property. That the attempt to transmit “science knowledge” is such a spectacular failure
in science education suggests a substantial
failure of the realist program to fit experience.
An alternative exists to this dismal prospect. The Swiss Genetic Epistemologist, Jean
Piaget, and his colleagues studied the thinking of children and students for more than 60
years. This work focused not on what happens
in school, but on what appears to be happening in the minds of young human beings.
Piaget and his co-workers developed an
explanatory model for the developmental
processes they observed in many students
(Piaget 1985). Human beings establish and
maintain equilibrium between their conceptions of their world and their experiences in
their world. When they perceive disequilibration, they move to re-establish equilibrium.
This can happen in either of two ways. The
offending experience can be ignored or
avoided, swept under the carpet, so to speak.
On the other hand, conceptions of the world
can be changed such that the offending experience no longer offends.
In this model, human beings are constantly experiencing their world. There is a
constant, not always conscious, checking of
these experiences against expectations based
on existing explanatory schemes. As long as
experiences are consistent with existing
explanatory conceptions, these experiences
reinforce those conceptions. It should be
noted that a significant part of this process is
the selective ignoring of certain differences
that in the applicable conception are deemed
unimportant. This processing of experience
that matches or fits existing explanatory conceptions is called by Piaget “assimilation.”
Under these conditions, existing explanations
account for experience, hence there is neither
need nor motivation to revise or devise new
explanatory conceptions. There is equilibrium between experience and existing explanation.
When experience is encountered that is
perceived not to fit existing explanation and
this mismatch cannot be ignored, a state of
disequilibration between explanation and
experience is experienced. Once avoidance is
not an option, then a process of self-regula-
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tion is initiated and existing explanation is
modified and tested until the new or modified
explanation fits these new experiences. An
accommodation is developed. The disequilibration can be minor or monumental. Either
way the new explanation fits experience better
than the previously existing explanatory conceptions.
If one wishes to engage someone in developing new understanding, disequilibration is
key. This is central for any teacher who wishes
students to leave the instructional setting with
new understanding. The teacher needs to
understand the students’ thinking about a
phenomenon. With this understanding in
mind, the teacher needs to search for examples of experience with the phenomenon that
do not fit the students’ thinking. Having
picked an example, to maximize the chances
that students disequilibrate, the teacher will
engage the students in making and explaining
predictions about the example. This engages
commitment to the explanation by the students and makes explicit features of their
explanatory conceptions. The prediction sets
up a test of their explanations. If the teacher
has developed a sufficient understanding of
the students’ understandings, then when they
experience the example experience, they will
not be able to assimilate it. Disequilibration is
the result. If the teacher has not developed a
sufficient understanding of the students’
understandings, then they will be able to
assimilate the new experience. Disequilibration does not occur and no change in existing
explanations will be necessary. Even though
the students do not change their understandings, the event provides evidence for the
teacher to develop a better understanding of
the students’ understandings.
If, in the classroom, it is safe for their predictions to be found not fitting their explanations, then it is safe to speculate about and test
alternative explanations, on the evidence of
the new experience. These alternative explanations can be tested. This process of elicitation of explanatory conceptions, comparing
these conceptions with experience, and
resolving discrepancies can be cycled over
additional experiences that do not fit explanation at each cycle. The result is always explanatory conceptions that fit more experience
and usually fit more closely.
Dykstra (2005) shares data in evidence
that change in understanding the phenomena

can be the result of this approach to instruction. On established diagnostics of students’
conceptions, course averages for non-science
majors routinely change by four or five times
the amount the class averages change for science and engineering majors that experience
conventional instruction on the same topics.
The large change in understanding is not just
achieved by a few special students, but essentially by all who are willing to participate in
the process.17 The instruction described is
pursued with the goal of engaging students in
examining and testing their own sense of the
phenomena. This is in contrast to typical
instruction in which the activity has the
exclusive goal of transmitting the knowledge
to the students by telling and showing them.
The structure of the canonical knowledge
does not drive this instruction. Instead, the
students’ understanding and the experiences
it can be applied to drive the instruction. It is
not a focus on the phenomena, nor is it an
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attempt to guess what scientists figured out in
the past. It is a focus by the students on their
own understanding and testing it carefully
against experience with the phenomena. In
other words, it is the process that makes the
changes in understanding possible.

Disequilibration:
Key to breaking the
bonds of realism
If this approach to education can shed any
light on engaging people in constructing an
understanding of radical constructivism, it
seems to be in inducing disequilibration. One
cannot disequilibrate someone else, but one
can create settings in which people are more
likely to disequilibrate themselves. The effort
to accomplish this induction of disequilibration must be understood as a process. We do
not have the luxury of having an impartial
third entity, such as some physical phenomenon to check against. Consequently, all we
have to share is our words and the gestures we
make. The only experience another has to
work with to test their explanation of what we
are talking about is experience with our words

Notes
1. For the reader who is not familiar with
radical constructivism there are two
sources that serve as good starting points
for making sense of radical constructivism. The shorter of these two is the article
Knowing without metaphysics (Glasersfeld
1999a). The article is accessible on-line. A
more extensive description is in the book
Radical constructivism: A way of knowing
and learning (Glasersfeld 1995).
2. A few examples: Bickhard (1995); Phillips
(2000); Suchting (1992).
3. For example: Matthews (2000); Kragh
(1998); Nola (1998).
4. Since the objects of interest here are paradigms concerning the explanation of experience, any paradigm whose initial
assumptions do not fit experience will
have a hard time surviving the need for fit

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3

us. We cannot afford to let the risk of being
written off deter us from our efforts to induce
disequilibration. Without disequilibration,
no change in understanding happens.
It should be clear that this process requires
patience. We see this in Ernst von Glasersfeld’s
approach. For many his calm and patient
demeanor, coupled with his willingness to
interact, have provided necessary ingredients
to enable us to construct our understandings
of radical constructivism. We can only hope
to emulate him in our own efforts to help others understand.
Thank you Ernst for engaging with us in
constructing our own new understandings,
for being our mentor.

and gestures. Just as experience with a physical phenomenon neither conveys nor proves
the truth of an explanation, our words and
gestures do not convey or prove meaning to
someone else. In the case of radical constructivism the process is more complicated and
requires more time than the phenomena of
introductory physics.18
It is necessary in our interactions with
realists that we recognize they do not realize
we are working with a profoundly different set
of initial assumptions. Society is set up by
realists to be compatible with their view. They
will work very hard at interpreting what we
say in their terms. They cannot “hear” what
we are saying in our own terms, because they
have yet to construct the requisite ideas.
Before they begin to develop another way of
thinking, they have to disequilibrate. We have
to calculate to say and do things, to bring their
attention to things that do not fit their realist
explanations of their world, i.e., things that do
not make sense to them. We run the risk of
their concluding we are deluded or misled.
This is the equivalent of sweeping the experience, and us, under the carpet. On the other
hand, there will be some who draw near to the
discrepancy they perceive and begin to
develop new conceptions in interactions with

In addition to the mentorship of Ernst von
Glasersfeld, I am indebted to Geshe Lhakdor
and Allan Wallace for the opportunity to
interact with them about Buddhist philosophy. A very large number of students have
helped immeasurably by being willing to
share their understandings with me. Contributions have also been made by two anonymous reviewers of this manuscript.

to experience. “Being explained” entails fit
between explanation and that which is to
be explained. Since the attempt is to explain experience, it is not an assumption
that initial assumptions in a paradigm
must fit experience. It is a consequence of
the belief that experience can be explained.
Fitting experience is the point of the process. An explanation that does not fit
would neither be viable nor an explanation. This is not uniquely Piagetian. It is
fundamental to the process of any attempt
to explain a specified set of experiences
from any paradigm. It is certainly the basis
of science.
5. It is important to keep in mind the difference between understanding a view and
accepting that view.
6. By “logic” and “logical operations” I mean
to distinguish initial assumptions, descriptions of experience and conclusions

from the logical operations used to derive
conclusions from the assumptions and descriptions of experience. The logical operations are in the “if…, then…” and the
“because…” parts of explanation.
7. This passage is reproduced exactly as it appears on-line. The only thing changed is
the font and font size.
8. It should be noted that in the case of this
particular author, reading the note in its
entirety reveals the author is working on
making sense of radical constructivism.
This is relatively rare. Most negative publications about radical constructivism are
attempts to disprove it, not understand it.
9. Alan Wallace (2006, personal communication) suggests: “The fundamental question as I see it is: are you seeking to
understand reality as it exists independently of perceptual experience and
thought? Or are you seeking to understand
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the world of experience (Lebenswelt),
which does not exist independently of percepts and concepts? Philosophical realists
are concerned with the former, whereas
Buddhists (especially Madhyamikas
[Middle Way adherents]) are concerned
with the latter.” In radical constructivism
the position is that our experiential reality
is all we can access. We have no way to access something that might be independent
of perceptual experience and thought.
This suggests a certain similarity between
the positions of Buddhism and radical
constructivism in contrast to realism.
10.One should note that Riegler (2001) shows
how one can understand science from a
radical constructivist point of view. Of
course, the drive to find truth is not part of
this way of understanding science.
11.Others associated with radical constructivism have explored connections between
Buddhist thought and radical constructivism. The interested reader should consult
Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991). In the
present piece the point is not primarily the
similarities between the two philosophies,
but that both have faced analogous onslaughts from defenders of realism.

12.It is the case that Buddhism practices similar ideals to those of radical constructivism. In particular both are based on the
extent to which they fit experience. This is
one of many differences in Buddhism
from religions we in the west are generally
familiar with. The consequence is that
Buddhist philosophy evolves as does our
understanding in radical constructivism.
13.This explanation of the relationship between these philosophical schools was given in verbal interaction by Geshe Lhakdor,
Director of the Library of Tibetan Works
and Archives, Dharamsalla, India, December, 2005.
14. The Four Noble Truths in Buddhism and
their implications serve as the foundation
on which Buddhism and its philosophy
are built. They are: (1) All life in cyclic existence is suffering. (2) There is a cause of
this suffering, namely, craving caused by
ignorance. (3) There is a release from suffering. (4) The path to that release is the
eightfold Buddhist path of Right View,
Right Understanding, Right Speech, Right
Action, Right Livelihood, Right Effort,
Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration (Garfield 1995, p. 294). The order in

this list of the eightfold path has been adjusted to conform to the standard in Tibetan Buddhism.
15.One wonders with access to cinema premises, such as that in The Matrix, and access to virtual reality, if there is the slow
evolution of culture beyond realism. Sadly, many young people seem more interested in material gain. In this context it
appears The Matrix is still science fiction,
with the emphasis on fiction.
16.The typical conclusion first jumped to
about radical constructivism while still
rooted in realist foundations is that radical
constructivism is nothing more than the
absurd assertion of solipsism.
17.The elitist notion implied in the realist
criticism by their assumption that mere
students making sense about phenomena
cannot lead to what scientists have decided
is without merit in the light of this data.
18.The shift from the goal of students “getting” the distilled wisdom transmitted to
engaging students in making sense of their
experiences seems similar to Piet Hut’s
(2003) reference to “goal-as-path” forms
of Buddhism in contrast to what might be
goal-as-result forms.
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